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Cake day: June 22nd, 2024

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  • @dumnezero@piefed.social Could you update the link to the original article at https://www.spiegel.de/a-0d1883d9-b7dd-4e5e-a6f4-a3069b13b4dd asap please?

    English translation below

    Spiegel article, DeepL translation

    The legacy of reunification

    “First an exhilarating awakening, then a radical fall”

    **Victory of freedom or hostile takeover - East Germans look back on reunification in very different ways. Why is that? Sociologist Alexander Leistner has some explanations. **

    SPIEGEL: Some East Germans see the fall of communism in the GDR in 1989 as a peaceful revolution and a victory for freedom. In retrospect, another part views the change as a defeat and even sees the reunification as a hostile takeover of East Germany by the West. Where does this great contrast come from?

    Leistner: These are two highly condensed narratives about enormously complex events. They make history more tangible, but they also partly reflect individual experiences. Even in the 1990s, negative terms such as crisis, bankruptcy and even colonization emerged in connection with the reunification, including those of people whose livelihoods were damaged by reunification. Whereby negative images - as Pegida has shown - are not necessarily represented by those who lost out during the reunification.

    SPIEGEL: Does the emotional impact of the events of that time shape the interpretation?

    Leistner: Yes. Many members of the opposition in the GDR, for example, first experienced 1989 as an almost intoxicating awakening, an attempt to change the GDR - and then, from the fall onwards, as a radical fall into insignificance, because there was a lack of resonance for their ideas among the population. Many members of the opposition and their ideas were basically overrun by the East Germans’ desire for prosperity and freedom.

    SPIEGEL: The majority of East Germans were not active members of the opposition. How did they experience the fall of communism?

    Leistner: Millions of people were affected by the collapse of the East German economy and the loss of their jobs. Added to this was the degradation of many working women to housewives, the disposal of parts of the East German intelligentsia, the loneliness of the SED victims and other fates. For many people, the social awakening and democratic liberation were coupled with enormous disappointment and great uncertainty. These were sometimes shocking experiences that affected almost every family in East Germany.

    SPIEGEL: Did people feel threatened by the changes?

    Leistner: Many people certainly didn’t experience reunification as a reunification on an equal footing. Artists, for example - writers, actors, musicians - had to experience that their work was suddenly hardly appreciated anymore.

    SPIEGEL: Were many people hoping for a revolution in 1989, for freedom and consumption, but at the same time wished that their professional and social lives would remain unchanged?

    Leistner: You could say that. But you always have to be aware of the enormous dynamics of the development: In the summer of 1989, no one could have foreseen the collapse of the GDR. The collapse came completely out of the blue, and as a result there was a kind of surplus of the most diverse hopes.

    SPIEGEL: Including the hope that the break would not be too great?

    Leistner: Yes. Populist expectations of prosperity also played a role here, such as the slogan of the “blossoming landscapes” of the then Chancellor Helmut Kohl. However, that quickly proved to be an illusion.

    SPIEGEL: Why do many people still find it difficult to understand the fall of communism in 1989 as a complex historical process that cannot be explained in simple terms?

    Leistner: Simplistic narratives can be misleading, also in terms of remembrance politics. In reunified Germany, efforts are still being made to overload 1989 as an identity-forming moment. In speeches and exhibitions in the public debate about the GDR, 1989 is perceived as an act of self-liberation and as a completed process. This is an extremely shortened narrative, because for many people it was not always a success story, nor was it complete. The individual biographical catastrophes that the collapse of the GDR led to were not acknowledged for a long time, and in some cases were even stigmatized. Charred wreck of a Trabi (1990): “Sometimes shocking experiences”

    SPIEGEL: What effect did that have?

    Leistner: It created a lot of defiance among the people, recently a negative pride among the unadjusted, as well as great criticism of the dominance of West German elites and their perspectives.

    SPIEGEL: And this defiance reinforced a one-sided view of the reunification?

    Leistner: Yes. People who criticize reunification often still have the feeling that social change came upon them without them being able to help shape it. That’s why today, if you simplify it, there are two opposing points of view: reunification as a success story and the malicious takeover of the East by the West - basically a new beginning and a demolition version of reunification.

    SPIEGEL: Has the tendency to perceive reunification as an annexation increased in recent years?

    Leistner: At least among some people, right up to the absurd equation of the SED dictatorship with Merkel’s alleged dictatorship in right-wing circles.

    SPIEGEL: What mistakes were made in the West?

    Leistner: What many West Germans still fail to recognize today: Very little has changed in the West as a result of reunification, whereas almost everything has changed in the East. As a result of this disparity, there are completely different memories between the West and the East.

    SPIEGEL: Are right-wing circles in East Germany consciously picking up on that?

    Leistner: Yes. Although the AfD in East Germany, for example, is not only appealing to the victim role of East Germans, but rather trying to appeal to East German self-confidence and even present East Germany as the better Germany. It’s almost tragic - basically, it was only the AfD’s electoral successes in East Germany that led to more attention being paid to East German history after 1989.

    SPIEGEL: What would have to change for the fall of communism to become a common date in German history and not remain a divisive event between East and West for many people?

    Leistner: The empathetic West German view is still missing, there is a lack of understanding to recognize that the first experiences with West German democratic society were not only positive for many East Germans. Many people in the West still do not understand the shock of the almost lightning-fast transformation that hit the East Germans. To this day, however, accusations of ingratitude can still be heard in the West against the East Germans.


  • So, first, it’s at least a little interesting that you say nothing about EU sanctions against China in your response. That’s the one concrete point from my reply which you could have responded to.

    No I’m not spreading apathy and I support the communist party of Russia

    Funky. Otoh, you were basically saying that German politics is completely determined by corporates. That exact idea is spreading distrust in democratic processes and that is what I mean when talk about spreading apathy.

    Please stop doing the fucking Adam Curtis monologue about how Putin is psychically poisoning society

    I have no clue who Adam Curtis is. I am sure you know who that is. Rather consistently though in this thread, you seem to suggest things about me and put words in my mouth. Do you consider that good discussion style somehow?

    Your country has a problem with Russia because it has nationalized its oil supply

    What makes you think that?

    West Germany has had a relationship with Russia and its variously nationalized or semi-nationalized oil and gas infrastructure since the early 80s. And Germany has just progressively bought more of the stuff produced there.

    One of Germany’s chancellors even went straight from calling Putin a “flawless democrat” to lobbying for Gazprom. The German political system could never get its hands on enough Russian gas—even after Russia attacked a country that neighbors the EU in 2014. German politicians watched people in Poland freak out about Russia’s imperial potential for close to a decade and didn’t think anything of it. Germany literally allowed Gazprom to buy its national gas storage. That last bit is actually completely insane, even if the buyer of said storage hadn’t been an autocratic nation.

    Russia only became an issue to Germany, when it launched a full-scale attack on said country neighboring the EU.

    This isn’t a pissing match between countries

    I believe it is a war.

    this is about neocolonialism and Germany’s leadership is fighting for its place within that system

    Russia is not a colony, and it never was. Post-1990, Russia was largely just left to its own devices which you can certainly criticize as being unfair but I honestly don’t know what you get out of throwing the term colonialism around in this context.

    Honestly, this is such a warped view of reality. Germany is quite sure where it stands overall, as a defining part of the EU, amidst Western nations. To me, it seems post-1990 Russia never was so sure of its identity. Now the official goal appears to be filling that void with imperialist ambition. Russia being geographically large and geographically “close” to Germany does not really figure into the equation of political/economic/mental closeness though.


  • It’s China.

    And in practice, does the EU sanction China to any relevant degree right now? Afaik, there are some tame EV sanctions, and some provisions against too much low-value shit originally destined for the US being rerouted to the EU. Not much else.

    Germany cannot do any of the things you are proposing because it is not even politicians who make these decisions, it is investors

    Cool cool cool. However, if German politicians actually want something, they can be remarkably effective at pushing things through. That a large number of them are apparently easily corruptible does not mean that incumbent industries deciding industrial policy is some kind of axiom here. Incidentally, and I know—you don’t like elections, while our former minister for economy from the Greens was way too centrist and clearly also did listen to lobby bullshit, since we have a gonservative minister for economy, policy has actually changed quite a bit. Or, like, right at this moment, there are completely pointless, cruel, and illegal border checks that also massively hurt industry through traffic jams at German borders—and yet, this practice is continuing.

    All you’re doing then is spreading is apathy—and that tactic is remarkably in line with propaganda from the country you’re defending all the time.


  • We’re talking about the industrial capacity required for a green revolution, though! Aside from energy prices, that requires maintaining a stable talent pool of engineers, many different kinds of skilled workers! Just massacring the whole gas car industry isn’t even a good idea for that sake.

    Germany is fucking up on that front. But, fwiw, I never said, industries should be “massacred” — though granted, at this point, they are massacring themselves. Those German car sales in China are not coming back. And the anti-EV propaganda has worked wonders on the German public.

    But to a large degree that’s a result of Germany putting cart before horse: The industrial incumbents run industrial policy. And the incumbents want their existing business model to be stable until the next quarter. They also have a distinct lack of interest in science or innovation.

    We had German car execs deciding that subsidies should go into diesel cars, and federal research budgets should be spent on hydrogen cars without first researching whether hydrogen cars make any sense.

    We had coal people lobby to keep the already-trundling German coal industry alive, at the expense of the less well-connected solar industry that employed 5x as many people as coal.

    Incidentally, Japan went the same route. Some dude at Toyota apparently decided that Japan should ignore its leadership in Li-ion laptop batteries because surely hydrogen made from imported Australian coal is the future of transportation !!

    China went the opposite route: They listened to scientists, they prioritized energy autarky and increasing the size of the middle class. And then the state set industrial policy based on that.



  • I don’t know what you’re trying to tell me in the first paragraph, sorry. Sure, fossil energy prices went up since Russia started a war. They did go down again too, though, but perhaps not to 2019 levels.

    And sure, there are things that may be in Russia’s best interest. But are we really hoping that the weirdo who is in charge there will pursue them? Especially now, post-Covid isolation which apparently increased his imperial ambition. And no, I don’t want to be in a Russian-dominated economic zone between “Lisbon and Vladivostok”; that sounds like societal regression.


  • Destroying “your[sic] entire industrial capacity” is complete bogus, and you know that. The German economy has been in a recession for the most part, i.e. production was stable, rather than shrinking, that’s only changed lately. And there are multiple reasons for that recession too; being overly dependent on Russian fossil gas is one of those. Another is producing outdated overpriced crap like fossil-powered luxury cars and then hoping people in other countries are stupid enough to import those glossy turds.

    But of course Russia has a massive hand in the recession. Before Nord Stream was blown up, Gazprom already progressively reduced deliveries. Gazprom even already reduced supply before the war began, to be able to later pressure Germany into supporting its Russia’s war.

    And then, about those 6%: We just need to install heat pumps to massively cut primary energy usage. Over 50% of German gas usage is just heating. Those 50+% can be cut down easily with heat pumps.


  • Lol of course you think it’s Russian infiltration

    Yeah, lol of course I think that. I watched as Russia tried to pressure Germany with fossil gas, first by running Gazprom Germania’s gas storage low in the winter of 2021/2022, then by progressively cutting off gas flow in the Nord Stream pipelines over the first half of 2022. These pipelines being blown up finally put a hard stop on these tactics, thankfully.

    And yeah, lol of course I think that, knowing that various high-ranking CDU/SPD politicians like Kretschmer spend a lot of time trying to popularize the idea of a reopening of Nord Stream while they provably get a lot of mail from Gazprom somehow; knowing that SPD politician Ralf Stegner met ominous Russian fossil executives; knowing that Afd provably gets money from Russia and various Afd politicians give interviews to Russian propaganda outlets; knowing that Afd and Bsw somehow use the same regional bank whose director is known for his friendliness to the Russian regime.

    And no, Germany is not mortally dependent on US LNG. LNG as a whole is just the last 10% or so of fossil gas imports in Germany. If our absurdist new government wasn’t quite as irrationally focused on increasing our dependence on fossil gas, we could easily wean ourselves off that in the near future; we already reduced fossil gas usage by 20% in the past three years. The countries we’re now actually dependent on in terms of gas imports are Norway and the Netherlands.

    None of that is to say that there’s no influence from US private actors. KKR (an investor in Germany’s largest right-wing publishing house) and Black Rock (former employer of the new chancellor) certainly are major factors. There are also internal strictly domestic factors, such as BASF and Bayer who really like fossil stuff too. In other words, there certainly are colluding fossip interests here; but that doesn’t let Russia off the hook.



  • I find it a wild take to think that the 5% (or fewer?) “special” people will be enough to sustain a completely new, separate refueling network. If anything, these people may switch from gas/diesel to EVs a little later.

    EV charging infrastructure has a big potential to become a lot more flexible than whatever refueling infrastructure would allow, e.g. inductive charging, maybe even on the road, is likely to become a thing; battery swapping will become a thing at least within standardized fleets; on-car solar panels may start producing enough energy to allow typical daily commutes; … Over time, all that will ease pressure on the grid. Add in the requisite grid upgrades and Job’s your juncle.

    Economics is usually the all-overriding factor. Green hydrogen has a built-in price multiplier in comparison to electricity because it’s based on electricity but adds a bunch of extra inefficiencies in both production and in usage. And the cars are more expensive and much more intricate too. Apparently, in regular use-type situations like buses, current fuel cell designs even need to be replaced every 3 or so years.

    Toyota can’t make all of the inefficiencies go away. Even less so if Japan continues to produce its hydrogen from Australian coal. Toyota has had a couple of failed bets (H2, solid-state batteries), to the degree that they’re now so incapable in future tech, they need BYD to help produce models for the Chinese market. In RoW, they needed to go all-in on a 20-year-old technology that has extremely questionable decarbonization potential (gas hybrids).

    Other Japanese car manufacturers are also seeing their market share eroded in China and iirc, Mitsubishi even left the market outright. Meanwhile, German companies with their expensive and lackluster but workable EVs are at least doing ok-ish there.






  • Some of this article’s wording seems rather manipulative:

    manufactured with machine tools from the Swiss company GF. […] When contacted, the Schaffhausen manufacturer claims to have delivered them before 2018, well before the invasion of Ukraine. “No sanctions or other export control regulations have been violated in this context,” it said.

    SRF has analyzed Russian customs data for the first time and found that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, more than one hundred machine tools from Swiss manufacturers have found their way to Russia, despite sanctions.

    So they didn’t disprove GF’s claims regarding the Kalashnikov production machinery being sold before 2018. Then they found 100 other manufacturers who are producing machines that may or may not be used in war-related production.

    Admittedly, claiming innocence selling into Russia post-2014 is horseshit but it’s the kind of horseshit that flies, since everyone did that.




  • Nah, fuck us. The EU managed to not get to this point in over two years of war. Pre-Trump, a complete embargo on all Russian fuels (oil, gas, uranium, maybe even wood) would have been welcomed by the US government and Trump would have had a much harder time trying to roll back sanctions. Now that we fucked the dog on that issue, everything is much harder because the more fickle among EU government leaders will have two influential voices in their ears trying to avert further sanctions. I also think this war could have been over already if Europe had given more weaponry much sooner, sanctioned fuel imports much harder, and done anything at all to protect its societies from the influence of Russian propaganda (even RT is still easily accessible, just not at the same web address).